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Ignoring the Supreme Court:
State v. White, the Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators, and
Majoritarian Judicial Pressures
ERIC

W.

BUETZOW*

INTRODUCTION

As the end of Leroy Hendricks's prison sentence for child
molestation drew near, Kansas sought to commit him to a civil institution
under the state's Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA).' The SVPA
established commitment procedures for persons convicted of an
enumerated sex crime, who, due to a "mental abnormality or personality
disorder," are found likely to re-engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence Such individuals become eligible for commitment as a
"sexually violent predator" (SVP).3 After a jury found Hendricks eligible
for commitment under Kansas's SVPA, Hendricks challenged the
constitutionality of his commitment.4 The Supreme Court of Kansas
struck down the law as a violation of substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, however, holding in a five-to-four
of -this type 6 do not violate the Fourteenth
decision that commitments
,
Amendment's due process requirements. The Court wrote:
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo7. I would like to
give thanks to Professor David Faigman for his guidance on this Note and special thanks to my family
for their unwavering support.
i. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29aoi to -29a2I (2oo5); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,350 (1997).

2. § 59-29ao2. Under the Kansas SVPA, these elements must be proved at trial beyond a
reasonable doubt following a probable cause determination by the court. § 59-29ao5, -29ao7(a).

3. The SVPA defines a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence." § 59-29ao2(a).
4. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996).
5. Id. at138.
6. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371. The Court also held that the SVPA is "non-punitive" and thus
violates neither the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition nor its ban on ex post facto law
making. Id. at 369.
[4131
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[Hendricks's] admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a
prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes
Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.
Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a "mental
abnormality" under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process
purposes.7

While the Court settled the debate over the ultimate
constitutionality of the type of commitment in Hendricks, the Court left
uncertain the precise requirements demanded by substantive due process
in this context. Specifically, does the commitment of a defendant who
does not suffer from a "lack of volitional control" still pass constitutional
muster? If not, what degree of volitional inability sufficiently warrants
commitment?
Because of this initial uncertainty, the Court was forced to clarify its
position five years later in Kansas v. Crane.8 In Crane, the Kansas
Supreme Court had once again overruled the civil commitment of a sex
offender under the Kansas SVPA on due process grounds, but this time
it had done so under the auspices of the Supreme Court's language in
Hendricks.9 The Kansas high court reasoned that Hendricks compelled a
finding that the defendant is completely unable to control his behavior, a
finding the trial court had not made in the case of defendant Crane."
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while Hendricks
does not require a finding of total or complete lack of control, "there
must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."" The Court
expressly rejected the notion "that the Constitution permits commitment
of the type of dangerous sexual predator considered in Hendricks
without any lack-of-control determination."" The Court vacated the trial
court's commitment of defendant Crane and remanded the case for
further proceedings.' 3
This could have been considered the end of the debate over whether
the Constitution requires a finding of serious volitional inability for the
civil commitment of sex offenders. Curiously, however, most state courts
which have subsequently considered the issue with respect to their state's
SVP statute refuse to mandate such a finding.
Part I of this Note will analyze the recent Florida Supreme Court
decision State v. White,' 4 the latest in a line of state court decisions that
7. Id. at 360 (quoting § 59-29ao2).
8. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
9. Id. at411.
io. Id.
i i. Id. at 413.
12. Id. at 412.
13. Id. at 415.

14. 891 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2004).
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essentially interpret around the Crane volitional requirement. This
analysis will demonstrate how the reasoning employed in White and
similar decisions is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Crane. Part II will discuss state court institutional schemes and explore
the possibility that majoritarian political pressures resulting from these
schemes could be playing a role in the state judicial analyses of SVP laws
against federal substantive due process standards. I suggest that, given
the current scholarship on popular judicial retention mechanisms, this
category of cases presents significant potential for political
considerations to enter the decisional calculus.
I.

STATE V. WHITE:

A

CONVENIENT INTERPRETATION OF CRANE

In 1995, defendant James White was convicted of sexual battery."
Four years later, prior to his release from prison, the State of Florida
initiated proceedings to have White involuntarily committed to a civil
institution pursuant to Florida's SVP statute, the Jimmy Ryce Act (the
Ryce Act).'6 Under the Ryce Act, like the Kansas SVPA, a defendant
who has been convicted of an enumerated sexually violent offense may
be civilly committed if he or she suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence if he or she is not7 confined in a secure facility for longterm control, care, and treatment.
After a jury found that these elements were met, deeming White
eligible for commitment under the statute, a Florida appellate court
overturned the commitment on the ground that the trial court erred in
denying White a jury instruction "as to an essential element of proof."' 8
That essential element was whether or not White had serious difficulty
controlling his behavior, an element required, the appellate court
reasoned, by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Crane.9 In
2004, the Florida Supreme Court granted review, giving itself occasion to
consider whether Crane indeed required a finding that the defendant had
serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior.
In a four-to-three decision, Florida's high court reversed the
appellate court ruling and held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Crane did not require such a finding and thus jury instructions on this

15. White, 891 So. 2d at 503.
16. See id.; see also The Jimmy Ryce Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394-910 to .931 (i999). For the history and
a general discussion of the Ryce Act, see Mari M. Presley, Comment, Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil
Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators'Treatment and Care Act: Replacing Criminal Justice with
Civil Commitment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487 (1999).
17. § 394-912(10).
18. White v. State, 826 So. 2d 1043, io44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam).
i9. Id.
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point need not be given." In other words, the court in White refused to
concede that Crane compelled an explicit volitional impairment finding
for the civil commitment of sex offenders in its state. However, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Crane,how does the White court justify this
result?
A.

PROBLEMS IN REASONING

Principally, the court in White proffers what appears to be a "same
result" or "functional equivalent" rationale. That is, that Florida's
sexually violent predator statute will in effect only net sexually violent
offenders who have difficultly controlling their behavior, thus negating
the need for an explicit finding on volition. The court reasoned:
Although the Ryce Act does not state the standard in terms of whether
the respondent has serious difficulty controlling behavior, it
accomplishes the same result. The respondent must suffer from a
"mental abnormality," which predisposes him to commit sexually
violent offenses. Moreover, the respondent must be "likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence," which means that "the person's propensity
to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a
menace to the health and safety of others." One who fits such a
description necessarily will have difficulty controlling his behavior. The
terms in the statute, when taken together (if not independently)
comply with the requirements of Crane.
But this view of Crane is problematic on multiple fronts. First and
foremost, it is difficult to adopt such a conception of Crane given the U.S.
Supreme Court's statement that "[w]e do not agree.., that the
Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sexual
offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control
determination."22 Furthermore, the mere "difficulty" of controlling
behavior that the White court depicts is undoubtedly less demanding than
the standard actually articulated in Crane, which requires "that there
must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."23 And, not
surprisingly, there is no mention by the Supreme Court in Crane of a
''same result" exception that would enable state courts to forgo a lack of
control determination."
There is no confusion within the Supreme Court itself as to what the
holding in Crane demands. In addition to the majority's language, Justice
Scalia clearly articulates, "[tioday's opinion says that the Constitution
requires the addition of a third finding ... that the subject suffers from

20. White, 891 So. 2d at 509.

21. Id. at 509-10 (quoting § 394.912).
22. Crane,534 U.S. at 412.

23. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
24. See 534 U.S. 407.
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an inability to control behavior." 5 Therefore, the source and existence of
any genuine ambiguity on the matter remains mysterious. It is largely
from relying on other states' decisions that the court in White came to
understand the issue as an open one.26
It is also important to highlight that Florida's Ryce Act and the
Kansas SVPA at issue in Crane are essentially identical. 7 The Court in
Crane found the statute and jury instructions based on the requirements
of the statue to be constitutionally unacceptable." Thus, for the Florida
Supreme Court to suggest that somehow the Ryce Act sufficiently
imposes what Crane requires is logically unsatisfying.
Specifically, the White court's view requires a leap in logic that the
Court in Crane was not willing to make. Under Crane, one who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder and is deemed likely
to commit future acts of sexual violence cannot be said to necessarily
suffer from serious volitional impairment, nor is the perceived likelihood
of committing future acts necessarily because of a volitional impairment.
As Justice Scalia points out in his dissent, a sex offender may have "a will
of steel, but . . . delusionally believe[] that every woman he meets is

inviting crude sexual advances." 9 Stated differently, a defendant may
suffer from a mental or personality disorder that has the effect of
predisposing him or her, at some level, to re-offending, yet
simultaneously be able to control his or her behavior to a high degree.
Such a person may nevertheless be found by a jury to be "likely" to
commit future acts of sexual violence.30
Yet under a logical reading of the majority view in Crane, a person
who fits this description would not be eligible for civil commitment. The
Court asserted that the volitional impairment requirement works
conjunctively with the other elements to achieve the constitutionally
important result of distinguishing dangerous sex offenders from the
"dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
25. Crane, 534 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent attacked the correctness
and wisdom of requiring proof of volitional impairment. Id. at 421-22.
26. See 891 SO. 2d at 507-09. Curiously, one state omitted from the majority's discussion is
Kansas. Id. Kansas followed the remand in Crane, mandating that a separate and specific jury
instruction be given on volition. See id. at 512 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting) (citing KANSAS JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS 3D CIVIL ch.

130.20 (3d ed. 2003)); see also id. at 516

(Anstead, J., dissenting). For brief discussion of other state court decisions on this issue, see discussion
infra Part. I.C. See also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States' Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2248-51 (2003).

27. See White, 891 So. 2d at 512 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting); id. at 516 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
28. 534 U.S. at 412.
29. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia would find that such an individual is a
dangerous sexual predator eligible for commitment under the Constitution. Id.
30. Such a situation is particularly possible in Florida under the Ryce Act, where "likely" is
defined merely as "a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others." FLA. STAT.
§ 394.912 (i999); see also White, 891 So. 2d at 503.
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case."3 Recall that in Crane, just as in White, the jury made affirmative
findings that (i) the defendant sex offender suffered from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder, and (2) his condition rendered him
likely to commit future acts of sexual violence.32 Unlike the White court,
the Court in Crane was clearly unwilling to infer the existence of
volitional impairment simply from these findings. Instead, it vacated and
remanded the case with instructions that "there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior."33 This move demonstrates that Crane
requires states to add additional protections beyond those already
implicit in their SVP statutes.'
Furthermore, as Florida's Chief Justice illuminates in his dissent, the
jury instructions eventually found to be inadequate in Crane were
actually more constitutionally desirable than the instructions given in
White.3" The original Crane instructions contained a substantive
definition of "likely," which was defined as "more probable to occur than
not to occur.,, 6 In contrast, the jury instructions given in White only ask
the jury to determine if the likelihood of committing future acts reaches
"such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others."37
It is difficult to imagine this standard posing much of an obstacle to a jury
considering the fate of a convicted sex offender who suffers from a
mental or personality disorder. It is even more difficult to appreciate how
this amorphous standard will necessarily net only those offenders who
have serious volitional impairment.
Undoubtedly, however, it must be conceded that a defendant's
likelihood of committing future acts as a result of a mental or personality
disorder and his or her inability to control behavior will often bear a
close relationship in most SVP cases. The Court in Crane admitted that
there may be "considerable overlap" between the factors and "our cases
suggest that civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders will
normally involve individuals who find it particularly difficult to control
their behavior." 8 Regardless, the Court ultimately rejected a view of
Hendricks and the Constitution that would permit different judicial
treatment for mental impairments already thought to necessarily be of a
volitional nature.39
31.
32.
33.
34.

Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
In re Care and Treatment of Crane, 7 P-3d 285, 286-94 (Kan. 2000).
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2248.

35. White, 891 So. 2d at 512 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting).
36.
37.
38.
("One's

Id. (quoting In re Care and Treatment of Crane, 7 P.3d at 288).
Id. at 5o3.
534 U.S. at 414, 415; see also In re Commitment of W.Z., 8oi A.2d 205, 217 (N.J. 2002)
likelihood to commit such acts obviously relates to the control determination that the trial

court must make.").
39. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 415 ("Nor, when considering civil commitment, have we ordinarily
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The White court also indicates that it found itself more inclined to
adopt the "same result" theory because the Court in Crane never
overruled the commitment in Hendricks even though defendant
Hendricks never received a jury instruction on inability to control
behavior. The court reasoned, "[it is telling that Crane upheld the
commitment in Hendricks as constitutional even though the jury
instructions in that case did not include a requirement of 'serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.""'4
But the Court in Crane seemed to preempt this logic. It emphasized
that in Hendricks, volitional impairment was never truly at issue. The
defendant had essentially stipulated to his own inability to control his
urges to molest children,4' and there was not much reason for the Court
to consider the matter in detail.42 Consequently, discussion of volitional
elements in that case is admittedly scant.43 Some have even depicted
Crane as "a belated effort by the majority to cabin its earlier decision in
Hendricks by limiting that case to its facts."' One would think this would
render Hendricks's commitment not particularly telling on the issue. It is
also worth noting that Justice Scalia presented the same argument in his
Crane dissent, not for disputing what the holding requires, but more
appropriately for disputing the correctness and wisdom of the decision. 5
Finally, the court in White quoted the Supreme Court's stated
principle that "'the States retain considerable leeway in defining the
mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual
eligible for commitment.' '' 6 The court in White used this notion for the
proposition that "the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule in this
context.""

There are contextual problems with the recitation of these
principles. Foremost, it is not immediately apparent how state discretion
in selecting mental and personality disorders for commitment eligibility
can be automatically transposed into state discretion over the
administration of the volitional requirements of substantive due process.

distinguished for constitutional purposes among volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments.").
40. White, 891 So. 2d at 5io (quoting Crane,534 U.S. at 413).
41. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414 ("Hendricks himself stated that he could not 'control the urge' to
molest children.").
42. See id. at 412-t3 (explaining that Hendricks "consisted of a special and serious lack of ability
to control behavior," and "[iun recognizing that fact, we did not give to the phrase 'lack of control' a
particularly narrow or technical meaning"); see also id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court
appears to argue that, because Hendricks involved a defendant who indeed had a volitional
impairment ... its narrowest holding covers only that application of the SVPA...
43. See id.at 412-13.

44. Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2245.
45. 534 U.S. at 421-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 510 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Crane,534 U.S. at 413).
47. Id.
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More significantly though, when placed in proper perspective, the
referenced statements of the Supreme Court in Crane can be better
understood as explaining the Court's reluctance to draw a bright line as
to the degree of volitional impairment that Hendricks and the
Constitution demand, not whether a finding need be made at all. It was
in the paragraph preceding these statements where the Court provided,
"we recognize that... 'inability to control behavior' will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there
must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."' The Court
then explained, "We recognize that Hendricks as so read provides a less
precise constitutional standard than would those more definite rules for
which the parties have argued. But the Constitution's safeguards of
human liberty [in this area] are not always best enforced through precise
bright-line rules."49
Thus, in the end, the court in White appears to impetuously rely on
the Supreme Court's admission of providing an imprecise standard with
respect to degree of volitional inability in order to maintain that Crane's
due process requirements are malleable to the extent that such
determinations need not even be made.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ISSUES

After holding that a lack of control determination need not be made
by the fact-finder for civil commitments under Florida's Ryce Act to pass
constitutional muster, the court in White then conducted a review of the
record based on a sufficiency of evidence standard to determine if the
volitional impairment requirements of Crane were in fact satisfied." This
approach raises further criticisms and questions.
Most glaringly, much can be said about conducting a review for
sufficient proof when an initial finding on the matter has never actually
been made. As dissenting Justice Anstead articulated:
[O]ur role and review of the sufficiency of the evidence is ordinarily
limited to a determination of whether the proof was adequate to
support a determination by the fact-finder, in this case a jury, on the
issue. Today, we have turned our role on its head by finding the
evidence sufficient on the one hand, but concluding that the jury does
not need to be told about the issue on the other.'

Further, the elements for commitment under the Ryce Act must be
established at trial by the standard of "clear and convincing evidence,"52
which far exceeds a showing of sufficient proof. Since White holds that a
48.
49.
50.
5I.
52.

Crane,534 U.S. at 413.
Id. (emphasis added).
See White, 891 So. 2d at 5o8-11.
Id. at 516-17 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
FLA. STAT. § 394.912(10) (1999).
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determination on volitional inability need not be made at trial, 3 the
requirements of Crane will be enforced only by a measure of "sufficient
proof," and only if appellate review is granted. While it is true that the
volitional requirements of Crane are constitutionally compelled, that is
not to say that the Ryce Act requirements for civil commitment are not.
In fact, Hendricks suggests the opposite.54 Hence, the Constitution does
not provide much justification for maintaining disparate standards of
proof for different commitment requirements.
Moreover, the approach of the Florida Supreme Court in White
raises serious questions as to how and when a defendant subject to
commitment under the Ryce Act may petition for redress under the
volitional requirements of Crane. May the issue only be raised on appeal,
at which time a "sufficiency of the evidence" review will be conducted?
May the issue be raised at trial post-verdict in a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict? May the issue be raised at trial pre-verdict
in a motion for directed verdict? The analysis employed in White
presents no obvious answers to these questions.
Lastly, the undertaking of the review itself can be seen as an
inconsistent directive to lower courts. The need to review the issue with
this or any other standard is contrary to the court's earlier proclamation
that one who fits the description of the terms of the Ryce Act
"necessarily will have difficulty controlling his behavior.""5 Are lower
courts supposed to conclude that a valid verdict for the State under the
Act must, ipso facto, satisfy the volitional requirements of Crane? Or,
must they conduct a review of the facts for sufficient proof of volitional
impairment specifically? If the latter is the correct option, then why
wouldn't adequate proof of the Ryce Act elements alone suffice given
the White court's "same result" conclusion?
C.

REASONING THAT TRANSCENDS FLORIDA

As previously indicated, Florida is not alone in its refusal to
explicitly implement the requirements of Crane in civilly committing sex
offenders. In fact, a multitude of states join in Florida's reasoning,
asserting that their SVP statutes sufficiently incorporate by implication
the demands of Crane. These states include California, 56 South Carolina,57
53. See White, 891 So. 2d at 508-09.

54. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (describing components of involuntary
commitment statutes that generally must be present for the statute to be upheld).
55. White, 891 So. 2d at 51o (emphasis added).
56. See People v. Williams, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d iI, 16 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd, 74 P.3d 779 (Cal. 2003)
("This [statutory] language clearly presumes a serious difficulty in controlling behavior: if a person
cannot control his dangerous behavior to the extent that he is predisposed to commit criminal sexual
acts and thus becomes a menace to others, he has sufficient volitional impairment to be found an

SVP.").
57. See In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338, 349 (S.C. 2002) ("Inherent
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Washington, 5 Illinois, 9 Wisconsin, 6° Arizona, 6' and Texas. 6' By and large,
"[t]hese state court decisions fly in the face of Crane.' ,6' They can be
regarded as the implementation of Justice Scalia's dissenting view that
the "'very existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
causes a likelihood of repeat sexual violence in itself establishes the
requisite difficulty if not impossibility of control." ' 64 In comparison, just a
handful of states have mandated the explicit incorporation of lack of
volition into civil commitment determinations in order to address the
Crane majority.6

Perhaps it can be argued that these results can be attributed to the
Supreme Court's own failure in Crane to specify "whether existing state
'
procedures comport with the lack of volitional control requirement," 6
which thereby facilitated interpretive exploitation in the state courts. But
again, the disposition in Crane-vacated and remanded-clearly
indicates the inadequacy of the original procedures and represents a
within the mental abnormality prong of the Act is a lack of control determination .... The Act's
requirements are the functional equivalent of the requirement in Crane.").
58. See In re Det. of Thorell, 72 P.3 d 708, 719 (Wash. 2003) ("Because the standard 'to commit'
instruction requires the fact finder to find a link between a mental abnormality and the likelihood of
future acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility, the instruction requires a fact finder to
determine the person seriously lacks control of sexually violent behavior.").
59. See State v. Varner, 8oo N.E.2d 794, 798 (II1.2003) ("Crane did not hold that the Constitution
requires a specific determination by the fact finder in every case that a person lacks volitional control,
because Crane upheld the commitment in Hendricks as constitutional, even though there was no
specific lack-of-control determination in Hendricks.").
6o. See State v. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 794 (Wis. 2002) ("Proof that a person is sexually violent
necessarily and implicitly includes proof that the person's mental disorder includes serious difficulty in
controlling his or her behavior .... ).
61. See State v. Ehrlich, 59 P.3d 779, 787 (Ariz. 2002) ("[A]lthough the statute does not expressly
refer to 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior,' the statutory language does embody the functional
equivalent of that phrase.").
62. See In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W. 3 d 500, 5o6 (Tex. App. 2003) ("A trial court
does not err in refusing to submit a jury instruction on the law which is already encompassed in the
instructions and question.").
63. Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2249.
64. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 797-98 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407, 419-20 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); accord Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2250.

65. See In re Det. of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, soi (Iowa 2003) ("[T]he [Iowa SVP] statute must be
interpreted to require a showing of a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, as the Supreme Court
held in Crane.");In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) ("In
short, Crane adds to Hendricks the affirmative duty to make a lack of control determination, which is
already a requirement of the Minnesota standard.
); Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.
2002) (holding that an instruction defining "mental abnormality," to comply with Crane, must state
that a "mental abnormality" is a "condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior"); In re Commitment of W.Z., 8os A.2d 205, 215 (N.J.
2002) ("The definition of 'sexually violent predator' requires proof of past sexually violent
behavior.
); see also KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 26 (requiring proof that a respondent's
disorder makes it seriously difficult for him or her to control his or her behavior).
66. Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2245.
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salient Frocedural component that state courts have conveniently
ignored. Yet, casting these arguments aside, a more fundamental
question exists regarding the state courts' underlying willingness to
perform an end run around Crane: if the reasoning of White and its
counterparts is indeed faulty, could externalities be a driving force?
II.

COULD IT BE? INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES AND
"ACCOUNTABILITY" IN STATE COURTS

Within the Crane and Hendricks cases exists a not-so-subtle intrastate battle between state political structures. While largely overlooked
amongst the legal wrangling over substantive due process jurisprudence,
the Kansas Supreme Court twice confronted the state legislature by
striking down its SVPA on account of federal constitutional rights.68 In
the years following, the same court also declared Kansas's administration
of the death penalty unconstitutional and ordered the Kansas legislature69
to spend a specific amount of additional money on public education.
Calls for retribution have since echoed from the state legislature. They
have proposed bills to direct the state judiciary closer to majoritarian
lines.7 ° Although the justices are already subject to a popular "retention
election" every six years, a proposed constitutional amendment would
abandon the current "merit selection plan" for picking Supreme Court
justices." Under the merit selection plan, an independent judicial
commission produces a list of nominees from which the governor may
select.72 The proposed amendment would replace this arrangement with
gubernatorial appointment and senate confirmation.73 One legislator
urged that judicial isolation under the current system "serves to
exacerbate public frustration
with an alienation from a process they see
74
as insular and elitist.
Among other things, these circumstances from Kansas are
illustrative of the fact that there are two main mechanisms available to
state majoritarian bodies with which they may attempt to control their
judiciary: judicial selection and retention.75
67. Id. at 2248.

68. See In re Care and Treatment of Crane, 7 P.3d 285. 290 (Kan. 2000); In re Care and Treatment
of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).
69. Associated Press, Committee Considers Changing Selection of Supreme Court Justices,
LAWRENCE

JOURNAL-WORLD,

Feb.

9,

2006,

http://www.ljworld.com/news/2oo6/feb/o9/

committeeconsiders.changing-selection-supremecou/?kansas legislature.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. KAN. CONST.art. III, § 5;see also Associated Press, supra note 69 ("In Kansas, a nominating
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JUDICIAL SELECTION MODELS: FRONT-END POLITICS

Generally speaking, states employ four models for initial selection of
judges and justices: gubernatorial appointment, partisan election,
nonpartisan election, and the "merit plan.", 6 Each of these methods
unavoidably thrusts judicial selections into the elements of modern
politics.
First, the gubernatorial appointment method frequently bases
appointments principally on political considerations." "Clearly, the
appointive method does nothing to lessen the effect of partisan politics
upon the selection of judges.... [A]t the very least, there is significant
potential for partisan politics to play the determinative role in the
selection of judges ... ,78

Second, both partisan and nonpartisan elections are undoubtedly
riddled with political elements, and purposefully so. Partisan elections
are at least partially modeled around the idea that judges should be
selected in the same mannrer as legislators, 79 while nonpartisan elections8
attempt only to remove the elements of partisan political affiliation. o
The subjugation of judicial candidates to the usual elements of political
campaigns remains inherent in both methods. More specifically, the
elections are expensive, and in large states extraordinarily expensive."
Accordingly, fundraising has become increasingly important to attaining
judicial office via election. Not surprisingly, lawyers have been the
principal contributors to judicial candidates. 82 Recently, individual
litigants and special interest groups have also stepped up their role in
financing campaigns. 83 The immediately apparent perception of "justice
for hire" only highlights the obvious political influence lurking in this
method of judicial selection.
Lastly, despite its name and the recent efforts of the Kansas
legislature, review of social scientific evidence does not lend credence to
the notion that "merit selection" is a better model for actually achieving
judicial independence.8' As previously noted, "[m]erit selection calls for
gubernatorial appointment of judges from a list of names submitted by
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing judicial selection and retention and what each of
the alternative methods of judicial selection and retention accomplishes).
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 17.
80. See id. at 25.
81. Id. at 19, 27. Costs to candidates may be higher in nonpartisan elections due to the lack of

party voting labeling and the corresponding cue. Id. at 27.
82. Id. at 20-21, 27.
83. Id. at 21-22.
84. Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, io6 DICK. L. REV.
729, 744 (2002).
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an independent nominating commission." 8' Evidence suggests that
because nominating commissions themselves become susceptible to
political influence and considerations, the merit selection plan does not
effectively insulate judicial selection from political forces. 6 Rather, "[t]he
forum for such political considerations has merely been shifted 'from
the
87
electoral arena to the commissions and the governor's mansion.
Thus, speaking broadly, all current methods of judicial selection
employed in state government structures allow for a significant degree of
political influx at the selection phase. No one method can be considered
the "best."8 However, the existence of political considerations on the
front end is not in itself problematic in relation to notions of judicial
independence. In fact, "[biased on the evidence to date, the conclusion
reasonably could be drawn that selective mechanisms simply do not have
much of an impact on the operation of state judiciaries." ' It is when
states also maintain majoritarian power over the retention of judges and
justices that external considerations are more likely to work their way
into judicial decision-making.
B.

RETENTION AND "ACCOUNTABILITY": BACK-END MAJORITARIAN
PRESSURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of modern state court
systems is the use of majoritarian means to control judicial retention.
While the federal selection model of executive appointment and
legislative consent surely maintains similar potential for political infusion
to that described above, unlike the Article III federal courts, the
overwhelming majority of states also utilize control mechanisms on the
retention end.' Thirty-eight states force their justices and judges through
either re-election or retention elections.9 In retention elections, a judge
runs unopposed and voters are asked whether the judge should be
retained in office.92 Additionally, of the remaining states, three utilize
popularly-elected legislative bodies for re-appointments or retention
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votes.93 The overall aim of these structural components is to introduce
some element of judicial "accountability."'
This overall institutional arrangement has led many, including the
American Bar Association, to question the true level of judicial
independence that can be achieved in state courts under such a model.95
The conceptual difference in levels of independence between the state
and federal institutions has long fueled the historical debate over the96
aptitude of state courts to effectuate minoritarian constitutional rights.
Many cite the substitute of popular elections for tenure protections as
the source of "clear disparity in the relative independence levels of state
and federal judges."' One legal scholar has even gone so far as to suggest
that absence of tenure and salary protection is so inconsistent with
concepts of basic fairness that it constitutes a procedural due process
violation. 9s He suggests, "[i]magine, for a moment, that the Chicago Cubs
announced that from this point forward, they would hire umpires,
unilaterally determine their salaries, and retain unreviewable discretion
to fire them at any time. Can anyone imagine that we could trust a call at
second base?"'
But despite decades of theoretical debate, definitive empirical
evidence of state court inferiority in protecting individual rights has not
been attained.'" In fact, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues that this
question is unanswerable empirically, and thus it is futile to inquire
whether states achieve actual "parity" with federal courts in their
willingness and ability to protect individual federal rights."'
However, even conceding Professor Chemerinsky's point that
overall comparative empirical data has been and will forever be
inadequate to show state court inferiority, accumulating evidence may

93. Arm. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note go (South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia utilize such
bodies).
94. See Reddick, supra note 84, at 739; see also Webster, supra note 75, at I-i.
95. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 91;Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and
Democratic Theory: A Comment on FederalJurisdiction and ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REv.
329, 333-35 (1988). See generally Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (examining constitutional difficulties with elected
judges).
96. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A
Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) [hereinafter Chemerinsky,
Parity Reconsidered] (proposing that litigants with federal constitutional claims should generally be
able to choose the forum, federal or state, in which to resolve their disputes); Redish, supranote 95.
97. Redish, supra note 95, at 333.
98. Id. at 335.
99. Id. at 333.
too. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered,supra note 96, at 256.

ioi. Id. at 255-73. But see Redish, supra note 95, at 338 (contending that the existence of obvious
institutional differences renders the lack of definitive empirical evidence non-determinative).
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distinct

pressures

resulting

from

majoritarian

accountability schemes are visibly manifesting themselves within the
state court institutions.
A 1992 study of constituent influence on state supreme court justices
examined death penalty votes in four states from 1983 to 1988. 02' The
study indicated that "[i]n order to appease their constituencies, justices
who have views contrary to those of the voters and the court majority,
and who face competitive electoral conditions will vote with the majority
instead of casting dissenting votes on volatile issues.' 3 Moreover, the
study further suggested that justices subject to election will act
strategically to minimize political opposition and are motivated by selfinterested desires of retaining office when faced with "possible sanctions
created by the institutional environment.' 4 The author of the study
concluded that, under certain conditions, justices subject to election
assume a "representational posture," and overall, "it appears that
judicial elections do have an impact on individual justices' voting
behavior in state supreme courts."' 5
Others, nevertheless, contend that electoral measures do not pose
effective threats of accountability to state judiciaries because incumbents
overwhelmingly succeed in re-elections and retention elections.' 6 For
instance, out of 3912 judicial elections in ten states from 1964 to 1994,
only fifty incumbent judges were defeated.' 7 As a result, some view the
use of elections as accomplishing a mere "rubber stamp approval of
incumbent judges..' ' .8
But it does not follow that the extent to which the threat is actually
carried out will necessarily determine the effectiveness of the threat
itself. It is faulty to assume "that majoritarian pressures would only
manifest themselves in the form of electoral defeats."" In a I991 survey
of judges who had recently stood for retention, three-fifths of the judges
who participated revealed that elections had a pronounced effect on their

102. Hall, supra note 89, at 427.
103. Id.
IO4. Id. at 428.
105, Id. at 442.
io6. See Reddick, supra note 84, at 739; Webster, supra note 75, at 18.
107. See B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, JudicialRetention Elections,34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1429, 1430 (2o) (citing Larry Aspin & William K. Hall, Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections:

An Update, 37 Soc. SC. J. 1,3 (2000)).
io8. Reddick, supra note 84, at 739 (quoting William Jenkins, Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins
When No One Loses?, 61 JUDICATURE 79, 80 (1977)). But see Joseph W. Little, Is Merit Selection and
Retention of Trial Judges a Good Idea?, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 15, 1999, http://www.floridabar.org/
DIVCOM/JN/jnnewsoi .nsf/8c9f 13012b96736985256aa9oo624829/486boboodbe227898
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exposing judges, as we now do, to the risk of facing genuine competitors on the hustings.").
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:413

behavior on the bench."' Eighty-six percent of judges perceived
themselves as "responding to their environment .... Of these modern
pressures, former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus observed,
"'[t]here's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political
consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make
them around election tine .....
Plus, as Professor Croley demonstrates, "the effects of such
pressures seem likely to be significant systematically--that is, not just for
those judges directly involved in salient elections."' " 3 For example,
California Superior Court Judge Joyce Karlin sentenced a defendant
shopkeeper to probation after he was convicted of manslaughter for
fatally shooting a fifteen-year-old assailant." 4 The sentence led to a
public campaign to unseat the judge in her reelection bid." 5 Although the
campaign failed, a fellow judge reportedly remarked to her colleagues
straight probation
regarding a pending case, "there's no way I can give
6
Karlin."
Judge
next
the
be
to
want
don't
I
because
The past two decades have provided plenty of judicial food for
thought. In 1986, a highly politicized retention election led to the ouster
of California Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Joseph Grodin, and Justice
Cruz Reynoso. ' 7 At issue was their voting record on death penalty
cases." 8 Opposition campaigns successfully portrayed them as "soft on
crime."' " 9 In 1996, supreme court justices from both Tennessee and
Nebraska were removed in similar fashion over the death penalty and
being "soft on crime ..... In 1998, California again saw campaigns waged
against Chief Justice Ronald George and Justice Ming Chin, who were
targeted by anti-abortion groups for rulings striking down abortion
regulation.'2' While both justices retained their seats, they were forced to
raise substantial funds to counter the attack,'22 which often requires
looking for contributions from lawyers and other interested parties who
come before the court.'23 Anti-abortion groups similarly went after

iio. Reddick, supra note 84, at 739-40 (citing Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention

Elections andJudicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994)).
I I I. See id. at 740.
112. Croley, supra note 95, at 694 (quoting Paul Reideinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J.,

Apr. 1987, at 58).
113. Id. at 740.
114-I d. at739.
I15. Id. at 739-40.
116. Id. at 740.
117. See Dann & Hansen, supra note 107, at 1431-32.

18. Id.
ii9. Id. at 1432.
i2o. Id. at 1434-37.
121. Id. at 1432.
122. Id. 1432-33.
123. Webster, supra note 75, at 37.
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Florida Chief Justice Lender Shaw and Justice Rosemary Barkett in T990
and 1992, respectively." 4

Judicial rulings on these "hot button" issues have been responsible
for setting off politically heated and expensive retention elections, and
likely will continue to do so into the future." 5 While more comprehensive
study of the effects of constituent response in state supreme courts is
needed,. 6 "it seems that at least some judges in elective states are
beginning to respond to majoritarian political pressures."' 27
C.

SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO SVPs AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

As demonstrated above, the judicial enforcement of minoritarian
rights may garner vociferous political reactions when non-conforming to
constituent value judgments. The nature of these reactions fosters
legitimate majoritarian pressures within the state court structure and
under certain conditions may generate at least some degree of judicial
response. The adjudication of substantive due process rights of convicted
sex offenders seems to embody a circumstance where, as with the death
penalty and abortion, the potential for these pressures to manifest
themselves is particularly high.
Initially, it's hard to imagine a minority group with weaker political
stature and stronger popular opposition than convicted sex offenders
who suffer from mental or personality defect. It is not surprising that the
political climate generated from crimes committed by released sex
offenders is responsible for the passage of SVP laws in the first place.
In addition, the continuing public rhetoric that surrounds this issue has
been characterized as one of "zero tolerance, '' .29 such that "[n]o
politician can afford to have any weakness on the issue exposed.'. 3 This
rhetoric has tended to "shape the problem of sexual violence in the form
of the archetypal 'Beauty and the Beast' [story],'' for which SVP
commitment statues have become the public's solution. 32 As a result,
once a state successfully adopts an SVP program, any efforts to limit the
growth of such programs are met with fierce public opposition."'

Therefore, the potential for strong majoritarian backlash
surrounding the judicial limitation of SVP programs is particularly high.
124. Id. at 36-37.

See Dann & Hansen, supra note 107, at 1436.
126. See Hall, supra note 89, at 432.
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It's not far-fetched in this politically volatile environment to envision that
justices who do vote to enforce constitutional limitations or safeguards
on SVP statutes are susceptible to being portrayed publicly as "soft on
crime," "pro-sex offender," or "anti-public safety."
Additionally, aside from the contentiousness that this issue brings
generally, state judiciaries face even more pressure when addressing the
specific threat of re-offense inherent in civil commitment decisions.
Imagine for a moment that defendant White had been released following
a Florida Supreme Court ruling vindicating his rights against civil
commitment under Crane. Further consider the enflamed political outcry
that would have been generated in the event that White re-offended
following the ruling. The judicial incentive that is subsequently generated
seems obvious. The element of re-offense that is present may push the
degree of political volatility beyond that which surrounds the death
penalty, the issue most responsible for removing state supreme court
justices."3
To further exacerbate the situation, an electorate upset over a state
court's ruling on the rights of sex offenders will not likely look to the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Crane as the source of the unfavorable
law. Speaking generally, voters are highly results-driven in judicial
elections.'35 That is, rather than evaluating jurisprudence, reasoning, or
even general judicial competence, "voters tend to cast their ballots on the
basis of whether or not they like the results in the cases that the judge
has decided.' ', 6 Legally persuasive sources of authority will not be of
much assistance to jurists fighting off popular opposition: "Though voters
may be somewhat more willing to accept a legal explanation for a
unanimous court's unpopular decision, the electorate can be expected to
demand greater accountability on issues where voters have information
and strong preferences and where judges have singled themselves out.' 37
In a very real way, state judicial determinations of the due process
rights of sexual predators have the potential to, at the very least,
generate contentious and hard fought retention bids. It is interesting to
note that all of the states that have thus far interpreted Crane as not
requiring a finding of volitional impairment employ majoritarian judicial
retention methods. Seven of those states use re-election or retention
elections, while one requires legislative reappointment.' 3s

134. A court's alternative to the death penalty is generally life imprisonment, removing judicial
responsibility for re-offense.
135. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on
JudicialRetention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988).
136. Id.
137. See Hall, supra note 89, at 43o-31.
138. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 90 (indicating that Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin use re-election or retention elections, while South Carolina uses
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Let it be clear that this is not to suggest that institutional political
pressures dispositively decided White and the various decisions that
follow its reasoning. Indeed, the state courts that have adopted the
opposing interpretation of Crane are also subject to retention elections
or re-election and are thus subject to the same pressures.'39 Rather, this is

only to suggest and evaluate the possibility that, when analyzing state
SVP laws against individual substantive due process rights, majoritarian
considerations and electoral incentive could be infused into the
decisional calculus, thus increasing the likelihood that states will prevail
in preserving their SVP statutes. For example, state supreme courts such
as Florida's may become subtly more inclined to rely on the reasoning of
those other state courts that, as of yet, have been able to maintain a
suspect interpretation of Crane. In these of all cases, "basic self-interest
may also be an important consideration to the state supreme court justice
when rendering decisions."' 4
CONCLUSION

The Florida Supreme Court is the newest of many state courts to
adopt a dubious and perhaps somewhat self-serving interpretation of
Crane.This interpretation is questionable and other states would be wise
not to follow suit. With the certainty of state law being in the greatest
interest of states both individually and collectively, an interpretation of
Crane that requires a specific finding on volition is constitutionally safer
and more jurisprudentially sound. The current split among states only
further emphasizes the possibility of Supreme Court review on the
adequate enforcement and implementation of Crane.4 ' Moreover,
requiring a finding on volitional inability is not likely to seriously inhibit
states in their commitment of sexually violent predators. The various
arguments and the Court's concessions regarding the interconnectedness
of volition, the "likely to re-offend" element, and the mental or
personality disorder element demonstrate this point. As noted by the
remarks of the Kansas Attorney General following the ruling in Crane,
"'[w]e'll have to show that a potential predator has a serious difficulty in
controlling his or her behavior,... [but] [f]rom a practical standpoint, I
don't think prosecutors are really going to change the evidence they put
on. ',' 42 Thus, states effectively risk very little by mandating a specific
finding on whether there is a serious difficulty in controlling behavior.

legislative reappointment).
139. See AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 90 (indicating that Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and
Missouri all use re-election or retention elections).
i4o. Hall, supra note 89,at 443.
141. The new composition of the Court may affect the extent that it enforces Crane.
142. Pfaffenroth, supra note 26, at 2248 (quoting Jim Mclean, Stovall Buoyed by Ruling on
Extended Incareceration, TOPEKA CAPITAL J.,
Jan. 23, 2002).
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The risk perceived may lie in public reaction to the state judicial
vindication of federal due process rights of convicted sex offenders up for
civil commitment. Current scholarship and electoral events across the
past two decades suggest that such political considerations may be
entering the judicial equation as a consequence of institutional state
judiciary schemes, namely majoritarian retention mechanisms. It is not
inappropriate to question the extent to which these considerations play a
role and the types of cases that are most likely to be implicated. The
interpretation of state SVP statutes against federal constitutional
standards presents a situation where the potential for political influence
within state judiciaries may be at a heightened level given the
distribution of incentives. Such scrutiny is particularly warranted in this
realm given the suspect reasoning that has been offered in favor of
preserving state SVP statutes.

